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BECAUSE WE SAID So: THE SEC's
OVERREACHING EFFORTS TO REGULATE
MINI-TENDER OFFERS

By Miriam R. Albert*

I. INTRODUCTION
A "mini-tender offer" is a tender offer to buy less than 5% of a class of
securities. Because § 14(d)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "1934
Act")' requires bidders to register only those tender offers that will result in
beneficial ownership of more than 5% of a class of securities, a bidder can
complete a mini-tender offer without registering the offer with the Securities and

Exchange Commission ("SEC"). 2 While mini-tender offers were initially used

most frequently to acquire illiquid limited partnership interests, the use of minitender offers has expanded over time. 3 Now bidders are making mini-tender offers
*
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BA, Tufts University, 1984. The Author would like to thank those who provided valuable
assistance: Donna Gitter, Joel Reichart, Joan and Marty Yazmir, and especially Dan Berick.
1.
15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (2003). All statutory citations herein are to the 1934
Act, unless otherwise indicated.
See Commission Guidance on Mini-Tender Offers and Limited Partnership
2.
Tender Offers, Exchange Act Release No. 34-43069, at 2246, 64 FR 46581 (July 24, 2000)
[hereinafter Mini-Tender Offer Release].
3.
See Daniel G. Berick, SEC Issues Guidance to Broker-DealersParticipating
in "Mini-Tenders," available at http://www.modaq.com (Oct. 15, 2001) [on file with the
Author]. See also Troy Flint, Beware the Lure of Mini-Tenders; Check Price Before Biting
at Purchase Offer, THE PLAIN DEALER, Mar. 15, 1999, at IC; Toddi Gutner, Psst! Wanna
Lose More Money?, Bus. WK., Aug. 19, 1996, at 65; Edward D. Herlihy & Trevor S.
Norwitz, SEC Provides Mini-Tender Guidance, at http://www.wrhambrecht.com/comp
/ma/news/pdf/secguidance-08_03_00.pdf(Aug. 3, 2000).
The typical mini-tender offeror would find an illiquid and under-valued limited
partnership and solicit the limited partners to buy them out. Once the bidder accumulated a
toe-hold interest, he became entitled as a limited partner to a list of partners, a necessary
starting point for the mini-tender offer. Since many limited partners might not realize that an
active secondary market may exist for their limited partner interests, the bidder might be
able to buy up to 4.9% of the outstanding units at a price less than the secondary market
price. See Gregory V. Varallo & Russell C. Silberglied, Litigation Involving 'Takeovers' of
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for corporate securities, particularly in the high-tech arena, and for shares of
exchange-listed closed-end funds. 4 To the SEC and to issuers, mini-tender offers
are a coercive takeover abuse, violating the protective spirit of the Williams Act
through insufficient and deceptive disclosure. To mini-tender offerors, it is an
efficient and legal mechanism to buy securities from willing sellers.5
However characterized, mini-tender offers have rocketed in popularity in
the past five years, as noted by the SEC.6 The Depository Trust Corporation
("DTC") reported thirty-nine mini-tender offers in 1997, and 537 in 1998. 7 DTC
noted a sharp rise in mini-tender offer volume during 1999, the last year for which
annual volume statistics are publicly available; in the first five weeks of 1999
alone, DTC received more than 300 mini-tender offers.' As of January 2001, DTC
was processing thirty to forty mini-tender offers each month on behalf of the

Limited Partnerships, INSIGHTS, Nov. 1997, at 7. A commentator presciently wrote in 1997
that if mini-tenders:
come to be an accepted way of buying securities, it is possible that this
technique could be used to acquire other undervalued but illiquid
securities. If the level of disclosure provided in the typical mini-tender is
accepted as legally sufficient, mini-tenders could be used to manipulate
market prices or to put companies 'in play.'
Edward D. Herlihy & Trevor S. Norwitz, A New Takeover Abuse: 4.9% Mini-Tender Offers,
I M&A LAW. 1, 22 (1997).
4.
Mini-Tender Offer Release, supra note 2, at 2247. See also Herlihy &
Norwitz, SEC Provides Mini-Tender Guidance, supra note 3. This is so, despite the fact that
buying less than 5% of the equity of a publicly traded company through a tender offer does
not seem necessary, as that size block can be amassed in the open market with relative ease,
albeit at the market price. See Herlihy & Norwitz, A New Takeover Abuse, supra note 3, at
22.
5.
See Barbara Martinez, How the Master of Minitenders Makes it Work, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 28, 1999, at CI.
6.
Mini-Tender Offer Release, supra note 2, at 2247. The mini-tender offer
phenomenon has crossed the border into Canada, since U.S. firms like IG Holdings, Inc.
have begun making mini-tender offers to Canadians. See infra notes 116-32 for additional
information about IG Holdings and its interactions with the SEC. The Canadian Securities
Administrators issued a public warning about mini-tender offers in September 1999,

followed by a list of guidelines backed by the threat that regulators would seek cease and
desist orders for violations thereof. See Watchdogs Seek to Rein in Mini-Tenders, TORONTO
STAR, Dec. 14, 1999. According to Stan Magidson, director of takeovers at the Ontario

Securities Commission, "[i]t's our hope that these guidelines will be sufficient, but if not,
the next step would be rules or regulations." Id.
7.
DTC is a subsidiary of The Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation, a
member of the Federal Reserve system, and a registered clearing agency with the SEC. See
Subsidiaries & Joint Ventures, available at http://www.dtcc.com/AboutUs/affiliates.htm
(last visited Dec. 24, 2002). DTC functions as a clearing house for the settlement of trades
in corporate and municipal securities and performs securities custody services for its
participant banks and broker-dealers. See In the Matter of IG Holdings, Inc., 1999 SEC
LEXIS 1649, at *2 (Aug. 19, 1999).
8.
See http://www.dtcc.com/AboutUs/1999annual/asset.html (last visited Dec.
25, 2002). See also Flint, supra note 3.
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securities firms and clients it serves. 9 In 2002, DTC processed 531 mini-tender
offers. o

The increasing popularity of mini-tender offers has highlighted a gap in
the federal tender offer rules.' According to the SEC, mini-tender offers are not
subject to the filing, disclosure, and procedural requirements of § 14(d) of the 1934
Act and Regulation 14D thereof, but are subject to the 1934 Act's anti-fraud
provisions of § 14(e) and Regulation 14E.12 Thus, mini-tender offerees are, absent
any additional statutory or administrative assistance, denied certain protections of
the tender offer rules, including proration and withdrawal rights. 13
The SEC has been vocal about the dangers it perceives from mini-tender
offers, bringing enforcement actions against mini-tender offerors, and issuing
9.
See Mike Barry, SEC Approves DTC's Policy on Mini-Tender Offers
(Dec./Jan. 2001-02), available at http://www.dtcc.com/Publications/dtcc/ianOl/minitender.
html.
DTC's policy with respect to mini-tender offers is:
(i) to make an offeror's information about a low volume [mini] tender
offer available to DTC's Participants through DTC's Reorganization
Inquiry for Participants Service (RIPS) on the condition that the offeror
uses DTC's Automated Tender Offer Program (ATOP); and
(ii) to make securities available to the offeror at the conclusion of a low
volume [mini] tender offer processed through ATOP only after DTC has
received payment for the securities from the offeror.
Id.
In order to assure that its participants receive the benefits of ATOP, as a matter of
policy DTC does not announce a low volume tender offer in RIPS unless the offer is
processed in ATOP. Those ATOP benefits include more detailed information in the RIPS
announcement and an indication of a tendered position in participants' daily statements
from DTC. Id. DTC requires the offeror in mini-tender offers processed through ATOP to
send payments to DTC for any securities in the offer before DTC will make such securities
available to the offeror, "to give its participants the efficiency and safeguards of payment
through DTC's facilities." Id. See also Len Boselovic, He Turns Mini-Tenders Into Maxi
Profits, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Aug. 21, 2000, at BI. The SEC approved a DTC
request to charge a $2700 processing fee to the offering company for all mini-tender offers,
effective February II, 1999. See Flint, supra note 3.
10.
According to DTC, approximately 65% of these were odd lot offers, DTC
does not solicit these offers; if a mini-tender offer is made and pays the $2700 fee approved
by the SEC for mini-tender offers, DTC will then publish the mini-tender offer to its
participant banks and broker-dealers. See E-mail from Jay Gottlieb of DTC (Dec. 26, 2002)
(on file with Author).
11.
Mini-tenders also have tax implications and raise significant fiduciary issues
for the general partner that are beyond the scope of this Article. See Herlihy & Norwitz, A
New Takeover Abuse, supra note 3, at 22-24 for a discussion of these issues.
12.
Mini-Tender Offer Release, supra note 2, at 2247.
13.
15 U.S.C. § 78(d)(5)-(7) (2003). See Herlihy & Norwitz, A New Takeover
Abuse, supra note 3, at 19. Proration rights protect tender offerees when the bidder seeks
less than an entire class of outstanding securities, and shareholders tender more shares than
the bidder seeks. In such case, the bidder must purchase the tendered shares on a pro rata
basis. See 15 U.S.C. § 14(d)(6) (2003). See also 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-8 (2003).
Withdrawal rights permit tender offerees to withdraw their tendered shares at any time
while the tender offer is open. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-7.
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investor alerts and an interpretive release.' 4 This Article examines the legalities of
mini-tender offers and of the regulatory responses thereto. Part Ittraces the
legislative history and operation of the Williams Act and its application to minitender offers. This Part concludes that mini-tender offers likely do not constitute
tender offers under the Williams Act as currently constituted. Part III evaluates the
regulatory response to mini-tender offers, demonstrating the insufficiency of the
SEC's efforts to curb abuses in mini-tender offers. This Part raises questions about
the statutory support for some such efforts; to date, such efforts include the SEC's
issuance of an interpretative release containing "recommended" disclosures for
mini-tender offerors, and a handful of enforcement actions for alleged violations of
§ 14(e). Part IV proposes several possible solutions to the problems created by
unregulated mini-tender offers. The Article concludes that the SEC must take steps
to bring mini-tender offers conclusively within the definition of tender offer for
purposes of the Williams Act, and then must promulgate binding regulations to
achieve the desired investor protections.

II. THE LEGALITIES OF MINI-TENDER OFFERS: WHAT LAW
APPLIES?
A. The Williams Act
A central tenet of the federal securities laws is that full disclosure is a
necessary element of investor protection.' 5 Nevertheless, prior to the adoption of
the Williams Act,' 6 tender offerors were under no obligation to disclose any
information to security holders when making their bid. 17 A tender offeror could
operate in absolute secrecy, failing to disclose his true identity, the source of his
funds, the identity of his associates, and what he intended to do with the target if
he gained control.' 8 As a result of price premiums, time limits, specified number of
shares to be bought, and "first-come, first-served" purchase policies, target
company security holders were often forced to act hastily on tender offers, without
the benefit of full disclosure.' 9 In response to the growing use of tender offers to
achieve corporate control, Congress passed the Williams Act amendments in 1968
to protect security holders from unfair or deceptive tactics in tender offers, and to
create a level playing field between bidders and targets.20

14.
See Part III
infra for a discussion of these efforts.
15.
Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783, 823 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). The SEC
considers its "primary mandate under the federal securities laws is to protect investors and
to act in the public interest." Tender Offers, Securities Act Release No. 33, 5731, at 2 (Aug.
2, 1976).
16.
15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)-(e) (2003).
17.
Hanson Trust PLC v. SCM Corp., 774 F.2d 47, 55 (2d Cir. 1985).
18.
Id.
19.
See Notes: The Developing Meaning of "Tender Offer" Under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1250, 1259 (1973) [hereinafter The Developing

Meaning of "Tender Offer"].
20.
H.R. REP. No. 1711, at 2 (1968). See also SEC v. Carter Hawley Hale Stores,
Inc., 760 F.2d 945, 948 (9th Cir. 1985).
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The Williams Act amended § 14 of the 1934 Act by adding disclosure
provisions in § 14(d) and anti-fraud provisions in § 14(e). 21 The disclosure
provisions of § 14(d)(1) prohibit tender offers for any class of a registered stock
unless a Schedule 13D and any other required information have been filed with the
SEC if, after the consummation thereof, the offeror would beneficially own more
than 5% of the class. 22 Regulation 14D applies only to tender offers subject to §
14(d)(l), and sets out specific disclosure requirements and mandates certain
procedural protections for those who tender.23
The general anti-fraud provisions of § 14(e) prohibit fraudulent,
deceptive, and manipulative acts in connection with any tender offer. Regulation
14E sets out the requirements for all tender offers.25 Significantly, neither § 14(e)
nor Regulation 14E contain the 5% threshold contained in § 14(d)(1), or language
limiting their application to tender offers for equity securities. 26 Thus, § 14(e) and
Regulation 14E apply to all tender offers for any type of security, registered
27 and
unregistered (except exempt securities under the 1934 Act), including debt.
Congress intended the Williams Act to be construed flexibly, in order to
effectuate its remedial purpose of protecting security holders from coercive tactics

21.
22.
23.

See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)-(e) (2003).

15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1).
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d (2003).
The disclosure [in Regulation 14D] focuses on the terms of the offer and
information about the bidder. The procedural protections include the
right to withdraw tendered securities while the offer remains open, the
right to have tendered securities accepted on a pro rata basis throughout
the term of the offer if the offer is for less than all of the securities, and
the requirement that all security holders of the subject class of securities
be treated equally. Also, Regulation 14D requires the bidder to file its
offering documents and other information with the Commission and
hand deliver a copy to the target and any competing bidders ....
Regulation 14D also requires the target to send to security holders
specific disclosure about its recommendation, file a Schedule 14D-9
containing that disclosure, and send the Schedule 14D-9 to the bidder.
Mini-Tender Offer Release, supra note 2, at 2246-47.
24.
15 U.S.C. § 78n(e).
25.
"As a means reasonably designed to prevent fraudulent, deceptive or
manipulative acts or practices within the meaning of Section 14(e)," rule 14e-1 provides
that all tender offers must be open for at least 20 business days. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e1(a) (2003); all tender offers must remain open for at least ten business days after any
change in the offering price or percentage of securities being sought. See 17 C.F.R. §
240.14e-l(b); and the bidder must promptly pay for or return securities when the tender
offer expires. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-l(c). In addition, the target must state its position on
the offer within 10 business days after the offer begins. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-2 (2003).
The target must state that it either recommends its security holders accept or reJect the offer,
it expresses no opinion and remains neutral with respect to the offer, or it is unable to take a
position on the offer. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-2(a).
26.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e). See also 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e.
27.
Mini-Tender Offer Release, supra note 2, at 2247.
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in tender offers.28 A determination that a particular offer constitutes a tender offer
under the Williams Act is thus a condition precedent to the applicability of any
protections thereunder. When the Williams Act became law, there existed a
general understanding among securities practitioners as to what constituted a
tender offer. 29 The legislative history of the Williams Act focused exclusively on
this conventional tender offer model. While the SEC and Congress have made it
clear that the scope of the tender offer rules exceeds any conventional definition,
the term has never been defined by statute or regulation. Commentators and judges
have suggested that the absence of a definition was intentional, so that the term
could encompass transactions not yet contemplated, with characteristics atypical of
traditional tender offers. 30 This flexibility comes at a cost. Those who structure
28.
Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783, 825 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (citing SEC
v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963)). See also Russell L.
Hirschhorn, Note: Discounted Mini-Tender Offer: A Fraudulent Business Scheme, 29
HOFSTrPA L. REV. 627, 640 (2000).
29.
See The Developing Meaning of "Tender Offer, "supra note 19, at 125 1.
A tender offer has been conventionally understood to be a publicly made
invitation addressed to all shareholders of a corporation to tender their
shares for sale at a specific price. Cash or other securities may be offered
to the shareholders as consideration; in either case, the consideration
specified usually represents a premium over the current market price of
the securities sought.
Id.

30.

Wellman, 475 F. Supp. at 825.
The SEC's initial position was that "a definition of the term 'tender
offer' is neither appropriate nor necessary. This position is premised on
the dynamic nature of these transactions and the need of the Commission

to remain flexible in determining what types of transactions, either
present or yet to be devised, are or should be encompassed by the term.
Therefore, the Commission specifically declines to propose a definition
of the term 'tender offer.'
Tender Offers, supra note 15, at 12.
At one point, the SEC did propose a definition for the term.
Recognizing the dynamic nature of these activities [tender offers], the
Commission has proposed a definition which would include within its
coverage at least certain of these diverse forms of transactions. The
Commission has done so because it believes that in substance many of
these transactions are in reality tender offers and that the public is
entitled to the benefits that would flow from their specific inclusion
within the provisions of the Williams Act.
Proposed Amendments to Tender Offer Rules, Securities Act Release No. 33, 6159, at 6-7
(Nov. 29, 1979); 44 Fed. Reg. 70349, 70350. The proposed definition is as follows:
(1) The term "tendcr offer" includes a "request or invitation for tenders"
and means one or more offers to purchase or solicitations of offers to sell
securities of a single class, whether or not all or any portion of the
securities sought are purchased, which
(i) during any 45-day period are directed to more than 10 persons
and seek the acquisition of more than 5% of the class of securities,
except that offers by a broker (and its customer) or by a dealer made
on a national securities exchange at the then current market or made
in the over-the-counter market at the then current market shall be
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commercial transactions, as well as those who evaluate the legalities of such
transactions, have spent countless hours trying to determine which transactions
constitute tender offers for purposes of the Williams Act. The SEC has had to
engage in a case-by-case analysis of transactions, to evaluate possible violations of
the tender offer rules, without having the benefit of an objective statutory or
regulatory standard.
In the absence of a statutory definition for tender offer, the courts have
interpreted the term using the legislative history of the Williams Act, guidance
from the SEC, and binding judicial precedent. The judicial evolution of the
definition of tender offer began almost immediately after the Williams Act was
enacted.3' Since then, the term has been interpreted quite liberally by the courts to
excluded if in connection with such offers neither the person
making the offer nor such broker or dealer solicits or arranges for
the solicitation of any order to sell such securities and such broker
or dealer performs only the customary functions of a broker or
dealer and receives no more than the broker's usual and customary
commission or the dealer's usual and customary mark-up; or
(ii) are not otherwise a tender offer under paragraph (b)(1)(i) or this
section, but which
(A) are disseminated in a widespread manner,
(B) provide for a price which represents a premium in excess
of the greater of 5% of or $2 above the current market price,
and
(C) do not provide for meaningful opportunity to negotiate the
price and terms.
Id. at 70358. After consideration, the SEC intentionally chose to leave the term undefined so
courts could be more flexible in finding the existence of a tender offer when evaluating the
new schemes and mechanisms that would no doubt be invented. "Aware of 'the almost
infinite variety in the terms of most tender offers' and concerned that a rigid definition
would be evaded, Congress left to the court and the SEC the flexibility to define the term."
Hanson Trust PLC v. SCM Corp., 774 F.2d 47, 56 (2d Cir. 1985).
The SEC's current thinking on what constitutes a tender offer can be found on its
website, which defines tender offer as a 'broad solicitation by a company or a third party to
purchase a substantial percentage of a company's shares or units for a limited period of
time." See Tender Offer, at http://www.sec.gov/answers/tender.htm (last visited Dec. 25,
2002). The tender offer must be for a "fixed price, usually at a premium over the current
market price, and is contingent on shareholders tendering a fixed number of their shares or
units." Id.
31.
Courts typically start the judicial interpretation of the term with the
description of a tender offer contained in the House Report by the Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, which held hearings on the Williams Act amendments. The Report
identified the relevant attributes of a tender offer to include a bid, a premium price, tender
by solicitee, and the conditional nature of the buyer's obligation. See Wellman, 475 F. Supp.
at 821, citing S. REP. No. 90-550 (1967) and H.R. REP. No. 90-1711 (1968), U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News 1968, p. 2811.
The offer normally consists of a bid by an individual or group to buy

shares of a company usually at a price above the current market price.
Those accepting the offer are said to tender their stock for purchase. The
person making the offer obligates himself to purchase all or a specified
portion of the tendered shares if certain specified conditions are met.
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include transactions well beyond the conventional understanding of the term,
typically involving an offeror seeking to gain control of the target company.
Courts evaluate whether a given transaction poses the same potential dangers that
prompted Congress to enact the Williams Act. This may seem appropriate at first
glance, as it seeks to further the Congressional intent. However, the approach is
ultimately problematic, requiring a case-by-case subjective analysis. As a practical
matter, applying the proration, withdrawal, and increased price rights of §
14(d)(5)-(7) to individual stock purchases would also be logistically difficult. 2
Yet in the absence of a binding uniform definition, courts have no alternative.
The first judicial expansion of the term was the 1972 Oklahoma district
court decision in Cattlemen's Investment Co. v. Fears, holding that a series of
negotiated purchases from a large number of security holders in a short time period
constituted a tender offer for purposes of §§ 14(d) and (e). 33 The Court based its
conclusion on the security holders' need for the disclosure and protections required
by §§ 14(d) and (e), finding the defendant's use of the mails, telephone calls, and
personal visits to contain "potential dangers which Section 14(d) of the statute is
intended to alleviate." 34 While the Court does not mention mini-tender offers, its
focus on "persons attempting to gain control of a corporation by means of tender
offers" mitigates against the inclusion of mini-tender offers in its definition of
tender offer.35
Not all courts have been as expansive with the definition of a tender offer.
In 1978, the Second Circuit had occasion to consider a Williams Act claim. 36 The
plaintiff in Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp. sought a very broad
interpretation of tender offer. 37 The trial court rejected Kennecott's claim that
Curtiss-Wright's acquisition had been made by a tender offer, finding it had
purchased substantially all the stock on national exchanges. 38 Potential sellers were
merely asked whether they wished to sell, offered no premium, and given no
deadline. 39 The trial court also found that the off-market purchases were mostly
Id.
Section (d)(5) provides withdrawal rights for those who tender; tendered
32.
securities may be withdrawn until seven days after definitive copies of the offer were first
published or sent to security holders, and after 60 days from the date of the original tender
offer. See 15 U.S.C. §78n(d)(5) (2003).
Section (d)(6) provides proration rights; if an offer for less than all the outstanding
equity securities of a class is oversubscribed within ten days of the start of the offer, the

bidder must purchase shares on a pro rata basis. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6).
Section (d)(7) provides increased price protection; if the bidder varies the terms of the
offer by increasing the consideration offered, the bidder must pay such additional
consideration for all tendered shares, even those tendered before the increase. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 78n(d)(7).
33.
343 F. Supp. 1248, 1251 (W.D. Okla. 1972).
Id. at 1251-52.
34.
Id. at 1251.
35.
36.
Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 584 F.2d 1195 (2d Cir.
1978).
Id.
37.
Id. at 1206.
38.
Id.at 1207.
39.
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made from sophisticated institutional investors, who the court found "unlikely to
be forced into uninformed, ill-considered decisions."40 This finding is consistent
with the holding in Cattlemen's, since these security holders were deemed not to
need the protections of §§ 14(d) and (e).
The Second Circuit noted that some courts and commentators had taken
the position that "other unique methods of stock acquisition which exert pressure
on shareholders to make uninformed, ill-considered decisions to sell, as is possible
in the case of tender offers, should be treated as tender offers for purposes of the
statute.,, 41 Nevertheless, the Second Circuit declined to broaden the definition of
tender offer, focusing on the difficulty in applying withdrawal, proration, and
increased price provisions of § 14(d)(5)-(7) to ordinary stock purchases.42 The
Court concluded "[i]f this Court is to opt for an interpretation of 'tender offer' that
differs from its conventional meaning, this is not the case in which to do it.",43 This
is further evidence of the cost of the flexibility gained by leaving the term
undefined. The Court would not need to make such a choice if the term were
defined by statute or regulation.
The 1978 Massachusetts district court opinion in S-G Securities v. Fuqua
also examined whether the defendants' method of acquisition of stock created the
same pressures and dangers that the Williams Act was designed to prevent.44 The
Court found this a difficult question in light of the absence of a statutory
definition, since the defendants' actions did not constitute a conventional tender
offer.45 The Court crafted a test to determine the existence of a tender offer,
finding that when the bidder publicly announced the intention to acquire a
substantial block of stock to gain control, and then rapidly acquired large blocks of
stock, the transaction constituted a tender offer.46
47
While some courts have followed the S-G Securities test, more have not.
The Ninth Circuit characterized the S-G Securities test as "vague and difficult to
40.
41.
42.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Kennecott's interpretation would render the five percent filing provisions
of section 78m(d)(1) meaningless except in cases where the purchaser
did not intend to obtain a controlling interest. It would also require courts
to apply the withdrawal, pro rata, and increased price provisions of
section 78n(d)(5)-(7) to ordinary stock purchases, a difficult if not
impossible task.

Id.
43.
44.

Id.
466 F. Supp. 1114, 1125 (D. Mass. 1978).

45.
Id. at 1124.
46.
The test requires that there be: (1) a publicly announced intention by the
purchaser to acquire a substantial block of the stock of the target company for purposes of
acquiring control thereof; and (2) a subsequent rapid acquisition by the purchaser of large
blocks of stock through open market and privately negotiated purchases. Id. at 1126-27.
47.
Courts that have opted for the S-G Securities test include: Panter v. Marshall
Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 286 (7th Cir. 1981) (also citing Wellman); Hoover Co. v. Fuqua
Indus., 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11809 (N.D. Ohio June I1, 1979) (also citing Wellmian);
Nachman Corp. v. Halfred, Inc. [1973-74 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rptr. (CCH) para
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apply," and found a determination thereunder to be subjective, made in hindsight
as an ex post facto evaluation of the marketplace's response. 48 According to the
SEC, courts generally apply the eight-factor test commonly referred to as the
Wellman test, designed to provide guidance "as to the traditional indicia of a tender
offer.",49 Referring to the Wellman factors as a "test" is a bit optimistic, as this
"test" does not generate uniform, objective results; not all of the factors have to be
present to find a tender offer, and not all the factors need to be afforded equal
weight.50 Although the Wellman test has been widely utilized, the list of factors
has never been codified. 5' The factors include whether the transaction:
1. involves active and widespread solicitation of security holders;
2.

involves a solicitation for a substantial percentage of the issuer's
stock;

3.

offers a premium over the market price;

4.

contains terms that are fixed as opposed to flexible;

5.

is conditioned on the tender of a fixed number of securities;

6.

is open for a limited period of time;

7.

pressures security holders to respond; and

95,589, at 95,590 (N.D. Il1.July 13, 1973); Cattlemen's Inv. Co. v. Fears, 343 F.Supp. 1248,
1251 (W.D. Okla. 1972), vacatedperstipulation, No. 175-152 (W.D. Okla. 1972).
Courts that have instead opted for the multi-factor Wellman test include: SEC v. Carter
Hawley Hale Stores, Inc., 760 F.2d 945, 950 (9th Cir. 1985); Kennecott Copper Corp. v.
Curtiss-Wright Corp., 548 F.2d 1195, 1207 (2d Cir. 1978); Brascan Ltd. v. Edper Equities
Ltd., 477 F. Supp. 773, 791-92 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); D-Z Inv. Co. v. Holloway [1974-75
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rptr. (CCH) para 94,771 at 96,562-63 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
SEC v. CarterHawley Hale Stores, Inc., 760 F.2d at 953.
48.
See Mini-Tender Offer Release, supra note 2, at 2246; SEC v. CarterHawley
49.
Hale Stores, Inc., 760 F.2d at 950. The Wellman test was first articulated by the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York in 1979 in Wellman v.
Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). The test is not universally revered;
commentators have criticized the test as inadequate, subjective, and unduly formalistic. See
Nathaniel B. Smith, Defining "Tender Offer" Under the Williams Act, 53 BROOK. L. REv.
189, 205 (1987).
50.
"Of course, in any particular factual context, the various factors may be
entitled to different weight in the final decision." Hoover Co., 1979 US Dist. LEXIS, at * 10.
See also Wellman, 475 F. Supp. at 824.
51.
The elevation of such a list to a mandatory "litmus test" appears to be
both unwise and unnecessary. As even the advocates of the proposed test
recognize, in any given case a solicitation may constitute a tender offer
even though some of the eight factors are absent or, when many factors
are present, the solicitation may nevertheless not amount to a tender
offer because the missing factors outweigh those present.
Hanson Trust PLC v. SCM Corp., 774 F.2d 47, 57 (2d Cir. 1985). So this list is so flexible
as to lose any semblance of a "test."
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would result
in the bidder acquiring a substantial amount of
52
securities.

B. The Williams Act and Mini-Tender Offers
Questions as to what provisions of the Williams Act, if any, apply to
mini-tender offers arose as early as 1972. 53 The Williams Act and its regulations
do not define, or even mention, mini-tender offers. According to the SEC, minitender offers are subject only to § 14(e) and Regulation 14E.54 By implication,
then, the SEC's de facto position is that § 14(d) and Regulation 14D are
inapplicable to mini-tender offers." With respect to § 14(d)(l), this position is
supportable as a matter of pure statutory analysis. Mini-tender offers are beyond
the literal scope of § 14(d)(1) since 56mini-tender offers are, by definition, made for
less than 5% of a class of securities.
However, with respect to § 14(d)(2)-(8), this position contains an
inherent inconsistency. By their terms, both § 14(d)(2)-(8) and § 14(e) apply to all
tender offers, without the 5% threshold required by § 14(d)(1). Thus the
applicability of § 14(d)(2)-(8) to mini-tender offers hinges on how tender offers
are defined. The flexibility sought by the courts and SEC in leaving the term
"tender offer" undefined has generated this uncertainty. If mini-tender offers are
within the definition of tender offer for purposes of the Williams Act, then minitender offers are within the literal scope of § 14(d)(2)-(8). Those who tender
thereunder would be entitled to the withdrawal and proration rights provided
therein. However, if mini-tender offers are not subject to § 14(d)(2)-(8), it follows
that they must not be tender offers. If mini-tender offers are not tender offers for
purposes of § 14(d), how can they then be tender offers for purposes of the antifraud provisions of § 14(e)? The SEC's overly narrow interpretation of the statute
raises the possibility that mini-tender offers are not tender offers for purposes of
the Williams Act.
The legislative history of the Williams Act is helpful in evaluating
whether mini-tender offers are within the conceptual scope of § 14(d)(2)-(8). The
statute's underlying purpose is to provide adequate information to security holders
52.
53.

Mini-Tender Offer Release, supra note 2, at 2246 n.3.
See The Developing Meaning of "Tender Offer," supra note 19, at 1258

n.49; Herlihy & Norwitz, A New Takeover Abuse, supra note 3, at 20-21. The Wellman

court weighed in on mini-tender offers:
The buyer need not seek one hundred percent or even a majority of the
stock of a company in order for its bid to qualify as a tender offer. The
Williams Act was drafted to cover only those tender offers resulting in
ownership of more than 10% (now 5%) of the stock of a corporation.
Thus, the Act recognizes the possibility that a purchase of even less than
5% might be a tender offer, although exempted from regulation.

Wellman, 475 F. Supp. at 821-22, quoting S. REP. No. 90-550, at 9 (1967).
54.
Mini-Tender Offer Release, supra note 2, at 2247.

55.

Id.

56.
As a result, security holders who tender in mini-tender offers are denied the
protections of Regulation 14D, which by its terms, applies only to tender offers subject to §
14(d)(1). See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d (2003).

908

ARIZONA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:897

confronted with a cash tender offer, analogous to that received in proxy contests.57
The protections of § 14(d)(5)-(7) further this purpose by mitigating pressures on
security holders to make uniformed and hasty decisions to sell, through statutory
withdrawal, proration, and increased price protections. Security holders facing
mini-tender offers would certainly benefit from the availability of these
protections, even though the bidder was not able to, and perhaps thus not seeking
to, acquire control through the mini-tender offer.5 1 Congress' specific interest in
regulating tender offers was centered on attempts to acquire control. 9 The statute
57.
However, disclosure alone constitutes a remedy for only one type of
potential abuse suffered by tender offerees. Other remedial action was required to eliminate
other abuses, including the disparate payments for shares tendered at different times in the
same offer, the lack of withdrawal rights and the lack of a fixed termination date. See James
J. Moylan, Exploring the Tender Offer Provisionsof the FederalSecurities Laws, 43 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 551, 556 (1974-75). In an effort to safeguard security holders from being
stampeded into tendering, the tender offer rules in Regulation 14D depart from the
"disclosure only" philosophy of the federal securities laws, and prescribe certain
transactional terms for third-party tender offers. The main purpose of these provisions is to
assure equal treatment for all security holders of the target. Id. at 564.
The provisions of Regulation 14D include: tender offers must be open to all security
holders of the same class, for a minimum of 20 business days and for 10 more days after
any change in the offering price or the percentage of securities being sought. See 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14c-l(b) (2003); security holders are permitted to withdraw their shares [revoke their
tenders] at any time while the tender offer is open. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-7; all security
holders must be paid the best price paid to any other security holder, and if the bidder offers
consideration alternatives [like a choice of cash or debentures], each security holder can
choose. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-10(c)(I) (2003); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-t0(a)(2); when the
bidder seeks less than all the shares, and security holders tender more than the bidder seeks,
the bidder must purchase the tendered shares on a pro rata basis and return unpurchased
shares. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (2003); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-8 (2003); the bidder must
pay for or return securities when the offer expires. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14c-1(c); and while
the bid is pending, the bidder cannot purchase outside the tender offer. See 17 C.F.R. §
240.14c-5 (2003). See also Hanson Trust PLC v. SCM Corp., 774 F.2d 47, 55 (2d Cir.
1985), quoting Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, 430 U.S. 1 (1977); SEC v. Carter Hawley
Hale Stores, Inc., 760 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1985), citing H.R. REP. No. 90-1711 (1968);
Wellman, 475 F. Supp. at 822; S-G SEC. v. Fuqua Inv. Co., 466 F.Supp. 1114, 1125 (D.
Mass 1978), quoting Cattlemen's Inv. Co. v. Fears, 343 F. Supp. 1248, 1251 (W.D. Okla.
1972).
58.
See The Developing Meaning of "Tender Offer, - supra note 19, at 1258
n.49.
59.
Id. at 1253.
It must be presumed, therefore, that Congress was not interested in
relieving pressure on security holders in all situations where it exists, but
only in those situations primarily thought to represent potential takeover
situations, with such situations to be isolated through the operation of the
5% condition in section 14(d)(I) and the 2% and issuer exemptions in
section 14(d)(8).
Id. at 1277-78. Some commentators dispute the importance of the role acquiring control
plays in the definition of tender offer. "Since it is possible to make a tender offer for less
than five percent of a target's securities and since such an amount does not approach a
controlling interest, the statutory language implies that the attempt to acquire control is not
an element in the tern's definition." See Smith, supra note 49, at 197.
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reflects this Congressional focus by authorizing the SEC to enact rules or
regulations that exempt all tender offers "not entered into for the purpose of, and
not having the effect of, changing or influencing the control of the issuer or
otherwise as not comprehended within the purpose of this subsection" from the
provisions of § 14(d)(1). 60 By definition, mini-tender offers cannot be used to
bring about a change in control. 6' Thus mini-tender offers, and all other tender
offers not designed to bring about a change in control, arguably are beyond the
conceptual scope of § 14(d)(2)-(8).62
Judicial interpretation of the term tender offer also supports the
conclusion that mini-tender offers are not tender offers for purposes of the
Williams Act. Mini-tender offers are not tender offers under the S-G Securities
test. The first prong of the test, which requires a publicly announced intention to
acquire a substantial block of stock for the purpose of acquiring control, is clearly
not satisfied. 63 While mini-tender offers do involve a publicly announced intention
to buy stock, the amount of stock sought, by definition, can be no more than 5%,
which is insufficient to acquire control. The second prong of the test requiring a
subsequent rapid acquisition of large blocks of stock is not satisfied either, since
mini-tender offer announcements are followed by acquisition of up to 5% of a

60.
15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(8)(C).
61.
However, "the mini-tender affords the bidder an opportunity to amass a
block of securities which can put the bidder in a position to influence governance or
position the bidder to solicit other holders to pursue a desired course of action." See Berick,
supra note 3.

62.
The 5% threshold in § 14(d)(1) is arguably Congress' estimation of a
material amount sufficient to raise concerns about takeovers:
Not all tender offers were made subject to section 14(d)(1)'s disclosure
requirement, apparently because Congress' principal concern was to
assure the shareholder substantial, timely disclosure in situations where
tender offers were potentially being used to gain control .... The 5%

ownership level necessary to trigger section 14(d)(l), and the limitation
of the section's applicability to equity securities, while not establishing
takeover intent with absolute certainty, together serve as a generally
reliable, objective indicator of a potential takeover situation.
See The Developing Meaning of "Tender Offer," supra note 19, at 1256-57. The threshold

triggering the disclosure requirements of § 14(d)(1) was initially set at 10%, and was
lowered to 5% by the Securities Act Amendments of 1970. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(h)(l)(A)(ii).
The decrease was undertaken to "provide public disclosure of impending corporate
takeovers at a more meaningful level." See Investor Protection in Corporate Takeovers,
H.R. REP. No. 91-1655; S. REP. 3431 (Dec. 2, 1970). After the enactment of § 14(d), the

SEC reported to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce that some acquirors
were limiting their open market purchases to less than 10%, presumably in an effort to
avoid the disclosure requirements. Id. The Committee believed that this practice was
depriving investors of material information necessary to enable offerees to decide whether
to tender, and indicated that "an investment between 5 and 10 percent of the securities of a
company can have significant impact on the public market for that company's stock. These
acquisitions may lead to important changes in management or business of the company and
the shareholders should be fully informed." Id. Congress could have removed the threshold
entirely, and chose not to.
63.
S-G Sec. v. Fuqua Inv. Co., 466 F. Supp. 1114, 1114 (D. Mass. 1978).
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class of stock; these offers arguably do not constitute the purchase of large blocks
of stock.64
Under the Wellman test, the status of mini-tender offers is unclear. The
typical mini-tender offer satisfies half of the Wellman factors.65 The first factor is
satisfied by mini-tender offers made through DTC, creating an "active and
widespread solicitation." The fourth factor is satisfied since the terms of minitender offers typically are fixed and not flexible. The sixth factor is satisfied since
mini-tender offers generally are open for a limited time. And the seventh factor is
satisfied since mini-tender offers put on offerees the identical pressure from which
the Williams Act was designed to, and does, protect offerees in traditional tender
offers.
Mini-tender offers do not satisfy the remaining Wellman factors. The
second factor is not satisfied, as mini-tender offers are solicitations for up to 5% of
a class of securities, not "a substantial percentage." The third factor is not satisfied
since mini-tender offers typically are made at a discount, rather than at a premium,
to market price. The fifth factor is not satisfied since the purpose of a mini-tender
offer is not to gain control, so in the typical mini-tender offer, there is no minimum
number of shares sought as is common with traditional tender offers. 66 The final
factor is not satisfied since the mini-tender offer will not result in the bidder
acquiring a substantial amount of shares.
The Wellman test is not dispositive on the status of mini-tender offers
under the Williams Act, since all the factors do not need to be present, and do not
need to be afforded equal weight. A court might weight heavily the lack of
solicitation for a substantial percentage of stock, and find that a mini-tender offer
does not constitute a tender offer under the Williams Act. 67 A different court, on
the same facts, might be persuaded that the pressures imposed on security holders
in a given mini-tender offer necessitates a finding that the mini-tender offer is a
tender offer under the Williams Act. As no mini-tender offer litigation has
explored this question yet, it is unclear what conclusion a court would draw on the
facts of the typical mini-tender offer.
The determination that mini-tender offers are not tender offers for
purposes of § 14(d)(l) has a number of ramifications. Security holders who tender
in a mini-tender offer are not entitled to the specific disclosures mandated in §
64.
Id. However, one commentator argues that a court could justifiably conclude
that a mini-tender for blocks of stock up to 4.9% of a class constituted a tender offer since
those blocks may be "large" if the transaction is viewed in light of the totality of the
circumstances. See Hirschhorn, supra note 28, at 647. This seems unlikely, and even if this
were so, because of the failure of the first prong of the test focusing on the acquisition block
of stock for the purpose of acquiring control, this argument is less than compelling.
65.
See supra note 52 and accompanying text for a list of Wellman factors.
66.
See Hirschhorn, supra note 28, at 646.
67.
One court applying the Wellman test indicated that while soliciting for a
substantial percentage of the issuer's stock was a necessary element of a tender offer, it was
not dispositive on the issue. "Since Congress enacted the Williams Act to permit informed
investor decisionmaking in the face of potential shifts in corporate control, there would be
no tender offer where a substantial portion of the issuer's shares was not involved." Hoover
Co. v. Fuqua Indus., 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11809, at *11 (N.D. Ohio June II, 1979).
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14(d)(1), or the protections of Regulation 14D. As a result, the benefit from the
requirement of Rule 14e-l(a) mandating that all tender offers be kept open for a
minimum of twenty business days is diluted; in the absence of withdrawal rights,
the length of the offer is of limited utility.68 Further, since tender offerors that are
not subject to § 14(d) and Regulation 14D are not legally required to send their
offer to the target, the target may not even know about the tender offer.69
A determination that mini-tender offers are not tender offers for purposes
of § 14(d)(2)-(8) would have dramatic ramifications. If mini-tender offers are not
tender offers for purposes of § 14(d)(2)-(8), then mini-tender offers are not subject
to § 14(e) and Regulation 14E. Even the flexibility intentionally created by leaving
the term "tender offer" undefined cannot justify two different definitions of the
same term, one for § 14(d) and another for § 14(e). A conclusion that mini-tender
offers are not tender offers under the Williams Act would obviate the need for the
SEC's interpretative release setting out the suggested disclosures to avoid violating
§ 14(e), and would undermine the regulatory justification for the SEC's
enforcement actions against mini-tender offerors under § 14(e). 7"

Il.

REGULATORY RESPONSE TO MINI-TENDER OFFERS

The SEC, as well as various industry groups, has weighed in on the
regulation of mini-tender offers. 71 The SEC's primary concern is with the risk to
68.

Herlihy & Norwitz, A New Takeover Abuse, supra note 3, at 20-21.

Mini-Tender Offer Release, supra note 2, at 2247.
69.
See id. See also Part III infra for a discussion of the Mini-Tender Offer
70.
Release.
The New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE") advised its member organizations
71.
to review mini-tender offer materials before disseminating them to customers:
Recently, there have been a number of tender offers for shares at below
market prices. The Exchange believes that, given the relationship
between member organizations and their customers, it would be prudent
for member organizations to conduct a review of such tender offer
materials before dissemination to customers. Member organizations
could thereby determine whether it is appropriate and in the best interest
of their customers to tender shares at a price below the current market
price of such shares.
NYSE Information Memo No. 99-11, Feb. 23, 1999. The SEC supports this position.

See Part IIIB infra for a discussion of the SEC's letter to the Securities Industry
Association.

The Securities Industry Association ("SIA") was concerned that investors might
believe incorrectly that they had to accept the below market offer, or that their broker-dealer
was endorsing or recommending the mini-tender by virtue of having sent it to them. The
SIA suggested that the SEC consider adopting a rule requiring mini-tender offerors to
disclose in plain English and in large size type: the offering price; whether the offer is at,
below or above current market prices; any marketplace events that may have caused an
unusual fluctuation in the market price of the securities; that an offer well below market
price would be a poor investment decision in most cases; and that investors are under no
obligation to tender their shares. See SIA Letter to SEC, dated Mar. 15, 1999. To date, the

SEC has declined to do so.
The National Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD") has no rule requiring
members to forward tender offer information to their customers. Yet some members do
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investors from insufficient disclosure in mini-tender offers. 72 The SEC has
mounted a two-prong approach to end what it perceives as abuses in mini-tender
forward such information, without regard to the merits of the offer. To deal with security
holders who tender in error or from a lack of knowledge about the effect of an offer, the
NASD sent a memo to its members, suggesting that those who do forward tender offer
materials consider including certain disclosures. For members who have not reviewed the
transmitted offer, the suggested disclosure is that forwarding the offer is not an endorsement
of the offer. For members who have reviewed the transmitted offer, the suggested
disclosures included whether the member is endorsing the offer and whether the member is
providing other information to assist the customer in deciding on the offer. The NASD
suggests that in any case, members should disclose that the customer is not required to
accept the offer. See NASD Notice to Members 99-53, NASD Regulation Offers Guidance to
Members ForwardingMini Tender Offers to their Customers (1999).
The National Securities Clearing House Corporation ("NSCC") filed a proposed rule
change with the SEC to permit it to process securities that were the subject of mini-tenders
through its continuous net settlement system ("CNS"). The securities involved were
McDonalds Corp., USX-Marathon GR., and Blackrock Inc. See SEC Release SelfRegulatory Organizations:National Securities ClearingCorporation;Notice of Filing and
Order Granting Accelerated Approval of a ProposedRule Change Related to Certain MiniTender Offers, Release No. 34-42873, 2000 SEC LEXIS 1114, at *2 (May 31, 2000). See
also 65 FR 36205 (June 7, 2000).
The Commission found the proposed rule change consistent with the requirements of
the 1934 Act. "Allowing these securities which are subject to mini-tender offers to continue
to be processed in the CNS system should help ensure the securities will be promptly and
accurately cleared and settled." SEC Release, 2000 SEC LEXIS, at *2.
72.
According to the SEC website:
"Mini-tender" offers are tender offers for less than five percent of a
company's stock. The people behind these offers-also known as
"bidders"--frequently use mini-tender offers to catch shareholders off
guard. They count on investors jumping to the conclusion that the price
offered includes the premium usually present in larger, traditional tender
offers. But with mini-tender offers, the price offered may actually be
below the market price.
Bidders in mini-tender offers usually limit the offer to tinder five
percent so that they do not have to comply with many of the investor
protections that are in place for larger tender offers. For instance,
shareholders in mini-tender offers don't receive documents that describe
the tender offer in detail.
Investors who surrender their shares without fully investigating the
offer may be shocked to learn that they cannot change their minds and
withdraw. In the meantime, they've lost control over their securities and
may end up selling at below-market prices.
Mini-Tender Offers, at http://www.sec.gov/answers/miniten.htm (last visited Dec. 25,
2002).
The SEC posted on its website "Mini-Tender Offers: Tips for Investors" to highlight
potential problems with mini-tender offers and to provide steps for investors to take when
asked to tender their shares in a mini-tender offer. These steps include:
*
Find out whether the tender offer is a mini-tender offer
" Get a copy of the offering document
* Determine whether the bidder has adequate financing
" Identify the current market price for your securities
" Find out the "final" tender offer price after all deductions are taken
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offers by putting pressure on two constituent groups it hopes to influence: minitender offerors and the broker-dealers who process the mini-tender offers. Both
groups arguably have a vested interest in keeping the SEC happy on the issue of
mini-tender offers, to smooth over future interactions on other issues. Yet even
under this two-pronged approach, the SEC can only make recommendations, and
then bring enforcement actions on a case-by-case basis for any perceived failures
to take such recommendations to heart, that result in violations of § 14(e). The
availability of these enforcement actions presupposes that mini-tenders are tender
offers for purposes of § 14(e). A judicial determination to the contrary would
eliminate the limited power of the SEC to bring ex postfacto enforcement actions
against mini-tender offerors.
A. SEC Pressure on Mini- Tender Offerors
The first prong of the SEC's approach to curbing abuses in the minitender offer process is evidenced by its July, 2000 interpretive release Commission
Guidance on Mini-Tender Offers and Limited Partnership Tender Offers (the
"Release"). 7' The SEC hoped that the Release would help bidders comply with
74
their legal obligations, including those arising under the anti-fraud provisions. To
put some teeth in its "recommendations," the SEC has brought a handful of
enforcement actions for alleged violations of § 14(e). 75 The SEC's primary
concerns about mini-tender offers center on inadequate disclosure to security
holders, insufficient dissemination of such disclosure, and late payment for
tendered shares.76
With respect to the quality of disclosure in mini-tender offers, the SEC
has acknowledged that the disclosure provisions of § 14(d)(1) and Regulation 14D
are not applicable to mini-tender offers. 77 Nonetheless, the SEC has expressed
concern over the quality of the (admittedly voluntary) disclosure made in the

Ask when you'll be paid for the shares you tender
Consult with your broker or other financial advisor
If you want to sell your shares, determine where you can get your best price
Remember that once you agree to a mini-tender offer, you are probably
locked in
The publication contains contact information for the SEC's Office of Investor
Education and Assistance, and contains a link to submit a complaint to the SEC. See MiniTender Offers: Tips for Investors, at http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/minitend.htm (last
visited Dec. 25, 2002).
Mini-Tender Offer Release, supra note 2.
73.
Id. at 2245. The Release contains a discussion of the application of the tender
74.
offer rules to tenders for limited partnership interests that is beyond the scope of this
Article. The suggested disclosures focus on offer price and price changes, withdrawal rights,
pro rata acceptances, target recommendations, identity of the bidder, ability to finance offer,
conditions to the offer, and extensions of the offer. Id.
See Part IIIA-2 infra for a discussion of these enforcement actions.
75.
Mini-Tender Offer Release, supra note 2, at 2250.
76.
Id. at 2247.
77.
"
•
"
"
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typical mini-tender offer, in two primary areas: offering price and offeror

financing.

8

Mini-tender offerors typically fail to disclose that certain fees or expenses
will be deducted from the offer price. 79 This lack of disclosure can make it difficult
for security holders to determine the actual price they would receive, and whether
that price is below market.8 0 Mini-tender offerors also typically fail to disclose
whether the offer price is below the market price. 8 This may be misleading to
security holders, since third party tender offers have historically been made at a
premium over the market price.82 But just because an offer is characterized as a
"tender offer" does not mean that the price is at a premium to the market. While
there are securities that trade so infrequently that it can be hard to ascertain the
market price, the market price of publicly-traded securities is available, and
investors should educate themselves before tendering.83 Admittedly, offerees have
varying levels of sophistication. Yet the SEC makes no distinction between
sophisticated and unsophisticated investors in describing the need to protect
investors from the dangers of below-market offers. Pushing the limits of credulity,
the Ontario Teachers' Pension Plan Board (the "Board"), a Canadian $59.1 billion
pension plan, brought suit against IG Holdings, Inc. ("Holdings"), alleging among
other things, fraud in connection with Holdings' January 1999 mini-tender offer
for up to 2% of Trizec Hahn Corp. debentures. The Board claimed that Holdings
failed to disclose that the offer price was below market. 85 In truth, the offering86
materials disclosed that the purchase price might not represent fair market value.
Apparently, the use of the term "tender offer" by Holdings was misleading to the
Board, and the Board claimed Holdings "exploited the conventional understanding
that tender offers are made at a premium to the market., 87 The Board further
argued that Holdings failed to disclose a trading history for the bonds in an effort
78.
79.

Id.
at 2247-52.

These fees often are disclosed only in the fine print in the docurnents that
the security holders send back to the bidder to accept the offer, but not in
the disclosure document itself. We believe that these disclosure practices
may, tinder certain circumstances, be "fraudulent, deceptive or
manipulative practices" within the meaning of Section 14(e).
Id.at 2248.
80.
Id.
81.
Most of these mini-tenders are done via summary letter to securityholders,
usually a page or two in length, setting out the principal offer terms. Almost no information
is provided about the identity and background of the bidder, the value of the underlying
partnership assets, the bidder's calculations underlying the offer price, any appraisals or
valuations the bidder got, the bidder's purpose in making the tender, bidder's plans about
the partnership, soliciting arrangements, financial data on the bidder, or risks associated
with the offer. Herlihy & Norwitz, A New Takeover Abuse, supra note 3, at 20.
82.
Mini-Tender Offer Release, supra note 2, at 2248.
83.
See Berick, supra note 3, at 2.
84.
See Ont. Teachers' Pension Plan Bd. v. IG Holdings, Inc., 2000 LEXIS
12591 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2000).

85.
86.
87.

Id. at *6.
Id. at *14.
Id.
at*10.
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to obscure the fact that the offer was at a discount to the market price." The
District Court dismissed the complaint, finding that the Board could have educated
89
itself as to the market value and trading history of these publicly-traded bonds.
The Court's decision illustrates that in the case of publicly traded stock, it is
unnecessary and inappropriate for the securities laws to protect security holders
who fail to do the minimal investigation of ascertaining the market price of their
securities.
In the Release, the SEC reveals that it considers both the failure to
disclose deductions from the final offer price, and the failure to disclose if the offer
price is below market, to constitute violations of § 14(e). 90 The SEC's paternalistic
approach is misguided. The SEC is authorized under § 14(e) to promulgate rules to
further the purpose of the statute. 9' It did so, promulgating Regulation 14E, which
it claims is binding on mini-tender offers.92 To date, the SEC has not promulgated
any regulations dealing with mini-tenders specifically. Accordingly, while the
Release is a good indication of what the SEC considers "fraudulent, deceptive and
manipulative practices" for purposes of § 14(e), it lacks the force of law. The
language of the Release itself demonstrates that it is not binding law, but rather
interpretative guidance. The Release is intended to "help bidders, subject
companies, and others participating in tender offers meet their obligations under
the applicable statutes and rules, including the antifraud provisions. ' 93 In general,
SEC releases are recommendations of how parties can fulfill their obligations
under the securities laws, and serve as an indication of the direction the SEC is
headed on the issues in the release.94 Currently, there is no binding law in § 14(e)
or Regulation 14E that delineates what disclosures are sufficient thereunder.
Mini-tender offerors also typically fail to disclose whether, at the
commencement of the offer, they have adequate financing to purchase the shares
sought. 95 A mini-tender offer made without adequate financing likely violates Rule
14e-8(c) which prohibits a person from publicly announcing a tender offer if that
person "[d]oes not have the reasonable belief that the person will have the means
to purchase the securities to complete the offer." 96 A bidder without adequate
financing could keep the mini-tender offer open until the market price rises above
the offer price. 97 Since the SEC's view is that those who tender in a mini-tender
88.
Id. at *6.
89.
Id. at*12.
90.
In 2000, the SEC brought an enforcement action under this fact pattern. See
In the Matter of City Inv. Group, LLC, 2000 SEC LEXIS 1206 (June 12, 2000).
91.
15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (2003).
92.
See Mini-Tender Offer Release, supra note 2, at 2246.
93.
Id. at 2245.
94.
Ont. Teachers' Pension Plan Bd., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at * 19-20.
95.
Mini-Tender Offer Release, supra note 2, at 2250.
96.
17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-8(c) (2003).
97.
Some bidders have devised schemes to confuse security holders about
the actual offer price. For example, we have seen situations where a
bidder makes an offer at a price above market but never intends to
purchase the shares in the offer at a premium. In these cases, the bidder
holds the shares tendered and continuously extends the offer until the
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offer are not entitled by law to withdrawal rights under § 14(d)(6), the bidder
essentially has a free option on the tendered shares. 98
The SEC's second area of concern is the actual dissemination of
sufficient disclosure to security holders in mini-tender offers. 99 Until the Release,
mini-tender offerors had no way of determining what methods of dissemination
would pass muster with the SEC, unless and until they were informed of an
enforcement action. Mini-tender offerors typically send their offers by providing
DTC with the offering documents, relying on DTC to disseminate the offer to the
relevant security holders through its participant broker-dealers and banks.' 0 DTC
forwards an electronic notice to its participant broker-dealers and banks, but these
entities do not always request copies of the offering documents.' 0' Even if they do,
they do not always pass along the full offering materials to the security holders; the
information the broker-dealers and banks send is often limited to the notice of 10the
2
mini-tender offer, the expiration date of the offer, and, in some cases, the price.
The SEC considers this an inadequate approach to dissemination, in
violation of § 14(e). 10 3 Rule 14e-l(a) requires all tender offers to be held open for
twenty business days from the date the tender offer is first "published or sent to
security holders."'' 0 4 But neither § 14(e) nor Rule 14E provide any guidance on
how tender offers should be "published or sent to security holders." The SEC
recommends that mini-tender offerors follow the guidance of Rule 14d-4 in
disseminating their offers, although the Rule, by its terms, is inapplicable to minitender offers.' 0 5 According to the SEC, the purpose of Rule 14d-4 is to "add
content and clarity to the term 'published or sent or given' in § 14(d)(I).' 1 6 The
rule provides three non-exclusive, voluntary methods of dissemination for cash

market price rises above the offer price. During this time, security
holders generally are not permitted to withdraw their securities from the
offer. Then the bidder purchases the shares at the offer price. In these
situations, the bidder does not disclose this plan to security holders. We
believe these practices are "fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative
practices" within the meaning of Section 14(e), and we recently brought
an enforcement action to stop such practices.
Mini-Tender Offer Release, supra note 2, at 2248. The SEC's position is that security
holders in a mini-tender offer are not entitled to withdrawal rights wnder § 14(d), so once
they tender, they are locked in and cannot take advantage of any new information or
opportunities to tender outside the tender offer, or at a higher price. Id. at 2248.
98.
See Herlihy & Norwitz, SEC Provides Mini-Tender Guidelines, supra note 3.
99.
The SEC comes back to this concern in its efforts to compel broker-dealers
to improve the quality of their disclosure in mini-tender offers. See infra Part 111B for a
discussion of the SIA Letter.
100.
Mini-Tender Offer Release, supra note 2, at 2248.
101.
Id.
102.
Id.
103.
Id. at 2251.
104.
17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-1(a) (2003).
105.
All of Regulation 14D is solely applicable to tender offers subject to §
14(d)(1). See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d (2003).
106.
Mini-Tender Offer Release, supra note 2, at 2250.
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tender offers. 10 7 The application of Rule 14d-4 to mini-tender offers, in addition to
lacking statutory support, poses a logistical complication in that mini-tender
offerors are not entitled to a stockholder list under Rule 14d-5.10 8 Thus, minitender offerors without a stockholder list must publish an advertisement in a
newspaper of national circulation. This may prove cost-prohibitive in light of the
small number of securities involved in the typical mini-tender offer, a result that
would not likely trouble the SEC.'0 9
The SEC's third area of concern is delayed payment to mini-tender
offerees in violation of Rule 14e-l(c). Bidders often wait as long as 30 days after
the expiration of the offer to pay for the tendered shares.' '1 By this time the market
price may well exceed the offer price, allowing the bidder to pay the seller, and
then immediately resell at a profit.''' Rule 14e-l(c) requires payment or the return
of the securities "promptly" after the termination or withdrawal of the tender
offer. 2 However, the term "promptly" is not defined in the Williams Act,
clouding the applicability of this payment provision and leaving a determination of
what constitutes "prompt" to be made from the practices of the financial
community, including current settlement practices.' 13 In the Release, the SEC
describes payment within three business days of the transaction as "prompt" for
purposes of Rule 14e-l(c).' 4 Although the Release lacks the force of law, as a
practical matter, bidders who exceed this time period do so at their peril.
In addition to the interpretative release, the SEC has also used its
administrative powers to bring enforcement actions against mini-tender offerors
for alleged violations of § 14(e).' ' A judicial determination that mini-tender offers
are not tender offers under the Williams Act would remove any statutory support
for the SEC's enforcement efforts. Since no such determination has been made to
date, a description of the SEC's enforcement actions against mini-tender offerors
follows, to highlight the SEC's desire to curb the abuses it perceives in mini-tender
offers by finding violations of § 14(e) for conduct prohibited in the non-binding
Release.
1. IG Holdings Inc. 116
The first proceeding instituted by the SEC against a mini-tender offeror
was the August, 1999 enforcement action against IG Holding, Inc."17 The suit
107.
The dissemination methods are: (I) publishing the offering documents in a
newspaper; (2) publishing a summary advertisement in a newspaper, and mailing a copy of
the full offering document to security holders upon request; (3) mailing the offering
document to security holders using a security holder list. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-4.
108.
Stephen 1. Glover & James J. Moloney, SEC Provides Guidance on MiniTender Offers and Limited Partnership Tender Offers, 4 N. 5 M&A LAW. 1, 4 (Sept. 2000).
109.
Id. at6.
110.
Mini-Tender Offer Release, supra note 2, at 2251.
Ill.

Id.
at 2248.

112.

See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-1(c) (2003).

113.

Mini-Tender Offer Release, supra note 2, at 2251.

114.
115.
116.

Id.
Id. at 2247.
In the Matter of IG Holdings, Inc., 1999 SEC LEXIS 1649 (Aug. 19, 1999).
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highlighted the SEC's concern that investors targeted for mini-tender offers
typically receive insufficient disclosure. 18 The defendant, IG Holdings, Inc.
("Holdings"), an Arizona corporation engaged in the business of investing in
securities, made over 200 mini-tender offers (mostly for 2% of a particular issuer's
outstanding stock) between June 1998 and August 1999.1'9 Holdings would
provide an information services firm with the names of target companies, the size
of the offers, the offering price, and the beginning and ending dates for the tender
offers. 20 The information services firm would then prepare a one or two page
offering document with that information, plus instructions on how to tender, and
would then forward the document to DTC. 12 1 If DTC found it could process a
particular offer through its facilities, it would announce the offer to its participant
22
The
banks and broker-dealers through an electronic announcement system.
23
banks and broker-dealers in turn sent the information on to their clients.' Thus,
Holdings used DTC's electronic broadcast system to distribute their 24mini-tender
to itself.
offers to thousands of security holders at only a nominal cost
The SEC determined that Holdings violated § 14(e) for failing to
sufficiently monitor the means used to disseminate its below-market mini-tender
offers. 125 As a result, security holders did not receive material information about

117.

On the same day it issued the order in IG Holdings, Inc., the SEC issued a

second order against a mini-tender offeror based on a literal violation of § 14(d). In the
Matter of Peachtree Partners, 1999 SEC LEXIS 1650 (File No. 3-9980) (Aug. 19, 1999), at
*2. The defendant, Peachtree Partners, a general partnership in Arizona, was engaged in the
business of investing in securities, primarily through making tender offers. Id. at * 1. On
July 5, 1998, Peachtree made a mini-tender to purchase 4.9% of the outstanding limited
partnership interests of Shearson Murray Realty Fund. At the time of the mini-tender,
Peachtree already owned approximately 1%of these securities as a result of another minitender in February, 1998. This pushed its ownership over 5%, triggering the filing,
disclosure, and procedural requirements of § 14(d) and Regulation 14D. Id. at *3. The SEC
determined that Peachtree Partners violated § 14(d) and Regulation 14D. In anticipation of
the institution of administrative proceedings by the SEC, Peachtree Partners submitted, and
the SEC accepted, an Offer of Settlement under which it consented to a cease and desist
order, without admitting or denying the findings of the SEC. See Offer of Settlement of
Peachtree Partners, July 15, 1999 (File No. 3-9981) [on file with the Author]. Since the case
deals only with a technical violation of § 14(d), and not disclosure or investor protection
issues, further discussion herein is not called for, except to note that Peachtree Partners is
affiliated with Ira J. Gaines, who ran Holdings. See IG Holdings Settles 'Mini-Tender' Case,
SEC Says, BLOOMBERG NEWs, Aug. 19, 1999. See also infra note I ll.
See SEC Sues IG Holdings, Inc. in First Ever "Mini-Tender Offer" Case;
118.
Warns Investors to Carefully Scrutinize Offers to Buy Their Stock, available at
http://www.sec.gov/ news/ press/ pressarchive/ 1999/99-10 l.txt (Aug. 19, 1999).
In the Matter of IG Holdings, Inc., 1999 SEC LEXIS, at *3.
119.
Id.
120.
Id.
121.
Id. at *4.
122.
Flint, supra note 3.
123.
DTC has since instituted a $2700 processing fee for mini-tender offers. Id.
124.
See also Mike Barry, SEC Approves DTC's Policy on Mini-Tender Offers (Dec./Jan. 200102), availableat http://www.dtcc.com/Publications/dtcc/anOl/minitender.html.
In the Matter ofIG Holdings, Inc., 1999 SEC LEXIS, at *3.
125.
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the offers. 126 The missing information included the calculation of the final
purchase price, 12 7 and disclosure that the offering price might not reflect the
market price. 12 Also, security holders were not informed in every mini-tender
offer that although they could not withdraw their tenders, Holdings could revoke
its offer at any time prior to completion. 29 All three of these omitted disclosures
later appear in the Release as required to avoid violating § 14(e). It is unclear how
Holdings was supposed to know of these "recommended" disclosures, short of
seeking a no-action letter for a transaction arguably beyond the scope of the tender
offer rules. Yet the SEC successfully obtained an Offer of Settlement under which
Holdings consented to a cease and desist order without admitting or denying
findings of the SEC. 30 The SEC hoped that its first enforcement action in the
mini-tender arena would serve as a warning to investors to monitor their
investments carefully. 13 1 As the settlement is only binding on Holdings, and has no
precedential effect on other mini-tender offerors, the SEC presumably hoped that
there would be an in terrorem effect from its first enforcement action in this
32
arena. 1

126.
Id.
127.
Holdings' offering prices were typically reduced by dividends or other
payments made to shareholders by the targets. Holdings' offering materials did disclose that
the offering price would be reduced by these payments, but failed to disclose the calculation
of the revised final offering price. Id. at *n. 4.
128.
There is no requirement that tender offers be made at a premium to the
market price. But registered third-party tender offers are typically offered at some premium
to the prevailing market price. Id. at *3.
129.

Id. at *5.

130.

Id. at *1.

131.

SEC Sues IG Holdings, Inc. in First Ever "Mini-Tender Offer" Case, supra

note 118 (quoting SEC Director of Enforcement Richard H. Walker).
132.

See Offer of Settlement of IG Holdings, July 15, 1999 (File No. 3-9980) [on

file with the Author]. Even that result has proved hard to achieve. At first it seemed that
Holdings had learned the lesson from the 1999 enforcement action. In a mini-tender offer
for Trizec Hahn debentures, Holdings did inform bondholders that they could not withdraw
their tenders. Further, Holdings described the final calculation of the offer price, and that the
offering price might not reflect the market price. See Ont. Teachers' Pension Plan Bd. v. IG
Holdings, Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12591, at *22 (Aug. 31, 2000). Yet the SEC recently
filed a complaint against Ira G. Gaines, the principal in Holdings, for much the same
conduct. According to the complaint, from September 1999 through March 2001, Gaines,
through two partnerships, made fraudulent mini-tender offers to buy up to 1% of the
outstanding stock of 287 public companies. See SEC v. Ira Gaines, 2002 LEXIS 2242 (D.
Ariz. 2002). The SEC alleges that Gaines mislead security holders by implying falsely that
he had sufficient funds to accomplish the tenders, failing to disclose his offer price was
below the market price, and failing to disclose that he retained the sole right to modify the
offers, including the price and offer period, and that he could terminate the offers without
notice at any time. Id. As a result of his insufficient disclosure, Gaines was able to extend
offer periods to capitalize on price rises in the targeted stock, and to reduce his offer price or
terminate the offer if the stock was in a declining trend, enriching himself by approximately
$275,000. Id. The SEC used the Holdings cease and desist order to demonstrate that Gaines
knew or was reckless in not knowing that security holders were not receiving this material
information. Id.
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133

In June, 2000, the SEC brought an action against CIG, John Barris, and
Tigran Papazian after they made a mini-tender offer for up to 2% of the
outstanding shares of Tellabs, Inc.' 34 The SEC found that respondents violated §
14(e) by, among other things, failing to disclose that CIG did not have the financial
ability to complete the tender offer, that the offer was contingent on financing, and
that the offer would be cancelled if35the market price did not exceed the offering
price at the conclusion of the offer.'
During the offer, Tellabs security holders tendered approximately 1.2
36
million shares, which, based on the offering price, totaled about $75 million.
CIG had assets of less than $10,000 and thus could not pay for the tendered
shares. 3 7 Respondents did not seriously seek financing until after the market price
was substantially higher than the offering price.' 38 Respondents terminated the
offer on November 19, 1999 without buying any shares from Tellabs security
holders. 139 The SEC found respondents violated § 14(e) because the missing
information about their finances was material, since a reasonable investor would
consider it to be important in deciding whether to tender. 140 Respondents
consented to a cease and desist order, without admitting or denying findings of the
SEC. 14 1 Again, the SEC was successful in an enforcement action for conduct not
specifically prohibited by the Williams Act.
3. SEC v. Leach

1 42

In November, 2000, the SEC brought an enforcement action against
Jeffrey and Hubert Leach, alleging that the Leaches made fraudulent mini-tender
offers through two shell companies Jeffrey Leach controlled: Carnegie Investment

In the Matter of City Inv. Group, LLC, 2000 SEC LEXIS 1206 (June 12,
133.
2000).
On October I, 1999, CIG tendered for up to 2% of Tellabs outstanding
134.
shares, offering $62.50 per share, which was a 12% premium over the closing price of
$55.875 on that date. The offering documents provided that tendering security holders
would be paid "in cash promptly at the close of the offer" but failed to include the material
information that CIG did not have the financial ability to complete the tender offer, and that
the offer was contingent on financing, and that the offer would be cancelled if the market
price did not exceed the offering price when the offer concluded. Id. at *3.
135.

Id. at *2.

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id. at *3.
Id. at *4.
Id.
Id.at *3.
Id.

141.
Id. at *5. See also Offers of Settlement of City Investment Group, LLC,
Tigran Papazian,andJohn Barris (File No. 3-10222) [on file with the Author].
SEC v. Leach, Litigation Release No. 16807, available at http://www.sec.
142.

gov/ litigation/litreleases/ r16807.htm (last visited Dec. 25, 2002).
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Management and LMC Assets. 143 The mini-tender offers were 44for shares of
Fleming Companies, Inc., Fruit of the Loom, Ltd., and Mattel, Inc. 1
The SEC alleged violations of § 14(e) and Rule 14e-l, stating that the
offering documents contained material omissions and false statements about the
offerors' intent in making the mini-tender offer, and their ability to pay for the
tendered shares.14 5 The Leach brothers borrowed $10 million against the value of
the stock they had not yet paid for, and used the money for day trading, in which
they apparently lacked expertise.146 Thus, since defendants structured the offers
without an escrow agent, they gained control of the shares before paying for them,
the equivalent of an unsecured loan and call option on the tendered shares. No
further information is publicly available about the status of this enforcement
action, beyond the complaint filed on Nov. 21, 2000.
47

4. SEC v. Genesis Leasing IX, Inc. et al1

In January, 2002, the SEC sought, and was granted, a temporary
restraining order followed by a preliminary injunction and other relief against
individual defendants Hoffman, Klinger, and Paonessa. These defendants
controlled and caused the corporate defendants to make at least twenty-one
fraudulent mini-tender offers for the securities of five publicly-traded
corporations. 48 The mini-tender offers were each accomplished through a threepage offering circular in which the offering price was on the first page, in bold
typeface, with the myriad deductions therefrom in very small, closely-spaced print
on the second page. 149 Because of the deductions, the defendants were able to pay,
in the aggregate, $2 million less than the market price of the tendered shares. 5 °
The court enjoined the defendants from further violations of § 14(e), froze the
defendants' assets, and permitted any investor who tendered in one of the minitender offers at issue to rescind its tender. 15' No further information is publicly
available about the status of this enforcement action, beyond the SEC releases
detailing the enforcement actions dated January 11, and 23, 2003.
These few enforcement actions have not been terribly effective in
curtailing the conduct described in the Release. Mini-tender offerors are not
required to file offering documents with the SEC before making the offer. In
addition, since mini-tender offers are made for less than 5% of a class of securities,
143.
See Complaint, SEC v. Jeffrey L. Leach, Hubert A. Leach, and LMC Assets
Corp., Litigation Release No. 16807, 73 S.E.C. Docket 233 (Civil Action No. 00 CV 5928,
E.D. Pa. Nov. 21, 2000).
144.
See Leach, supra note 142, at 2.
145.
Id.
146.
Floyd Norris, Wall Street Slept as Investors Were Fleeced of Millions, N.Y.
TIMES, May 12, 2000, at C1.
147.
SEC v. Genesis Leasing IX, Inc. et al, 2002 SEC LEXIS 60 (Jan. 1I, 2002);
SEC Litig. Release No. 17332 (Jan. 23, 2002).
148.

SEC v. Genesis Leasing IX, Inc. et al, 2002 SEC LEXIS 60 (Jan. II, 2002).

149.

Id.

150.

SEC Litig. Release No. 17332 (Jan. 23, 2002).

151.

Id.
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the dollar amount and small number of investors may not justify applying
significant resources to policing efforts. 152 The actions also lack precedential
authority. In one case, the enforcement action had so little impact on a mini-tender
offeror found to have violated § 14(e) that the SEC had to bring a second
53
enforcement action against him, three years later for much the same conduct.
The enforcement actions are useful, however, as illustrations of the SEC's position
on mini-tender offers, and its willingness to push the limits of its regulatory
authority to achieve its desired result.

B. SEC Pressureon Broker-Dealers
The second prong of the SEC's approach to curbing the abuses it
perceives in the mini-tender offer process focuses on broker-dealers. The SEC's
Office of Investor Education and Assistance issued a letter to the Securities
Industry Association (the "SIA Letter") resulting from a series of discussions
between the SEC and the SIA about the role of broker-dealers in mini-tender
offers. 154 The SIA Letter contains "recommendations of suggested disclosures for
broker-dealers disseminating mini-tender offer information." 55
The SEC also urges broker-dealers who elect to disseminate mini-tender
offer materials to their customers to inform their customers of potentially
problematic bidder practices, in essence suggesting the addition of "risk factor"
disclosure in mini-tender offers.15 6 This risk factor focuses on the bidder conduct
that the SEC finds particularly irksome, including inadequate dissemination,
inadequate disclosure of price, price changes attributable to transfer fees,
distributions or interest received, first-come, first-served purchase terms with no
withdrawal rights, inability to finance the offer, and the exchange of liquid
securities for illiquid securities. 157 The SIA Letter provides specific language for
the broker-dealers to send to their customers with each mini-tender offer.' 58 In the
alternative, the SEC suggests the broker-dealer simply include the SEC's
publication, "Mini-Tender Offers: Tips for Investors," when forwarding minitender offer solicitations to their customers. 59
The SEC acknowledges that there is nothing in the Williams Act or
regulations dealing with the practices of broker-dealers forwarding mini-tender
offers to their clients.' 60 In fact, aside from fiduciary duties under corporate law,

152.
153.

See Glover, supra note 108, at 1.
See supra note 132.

Division of Market Regulation: Letter to Securities Industry Association re:
154.
Broker-Dealer Mini-Tender Offer Dissemination and Disclosures, available at

http://www.sec.gov/divisions/ marketreg/ minitenders/sia072401.htm
[hereinafter "SIA Letter"].
Id.
at2.
155.
Berick, supra note 3, at 2.
156.
SIA Letter, supra note 154, at 3.
157.
Id.
158.
Id.
at6.
159.
Id. at3.
160.

(.July 24, 2001)
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there is no requirement that the broker-dealers forward the information at all., 6 I
The SEC is not seeking a uniform standard of conduct with respect to
dissemination of mini-tender offers. Rather, the SEC acknowledges that brokerdealers have adopted a variety of approaches to disseminating mini-tender offer
information, ranging from reviewing mini-tender offers before deciding whether to
send them on to customers, providing disclaimer language when forwarding the
materials, to electing not to forward the materials at all. 62 The last scenario is the
ultimate form of investor protection from a potentially abusive mini-tender offer;
the broker-dealer is in essence making the investment decision, on behalf of its
customer, and without instructions, not to tender for the client. The SEC's explicit
acquiescence to this practice
is further evidence of the suspicion with which it
63
views mini-tender offers.'

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS: How CAN THE SEC's GOAL OF
IMPROVING INVESTORS PROTECTION IN MINI-TENDER OFFERS

BEST BE ACCOMPLISHED?
The investor protections the SEC seeks are important and are in keeping
with the purpose underlying the federal securities laws as a whole. However, the
SEC's efforts to date have been insufficient to curb abuses in mini-tender offers.
Because mini-tender offers are beyond the literal scope of § 14(d)(1), the SEC has
no ability to review mini-tender offers before they are commenced and can bring
an enforcement action only after the alleged harm has occurred. 6 4 The initial
enforcement actions did not have the desired restraining effect, prompting the
issuance of the Release. The Release also proved insufficient as a deterrent, as
evidenced by the additional enforcement actions brought by the SEC thereafter,
and by the publication, a full year after the issuance
of the Release, of the SIA
65
Letter seeking assistance from broker-dealers.
The legal basis for the SEC's efforts raises two issues, the resolution of
which will enable the SEC to achieve more effectively the investor protections it
seeks in mini-tender offers. First, mini-tender offers arguably do not constitute
tender offers for purposes of the Williams Act and are therefore not subject to §
14(e) and Regulation 14E. The enforcement actions brought by the SEC lack
support as a matter of law, and constitute overreaching by the SEC of its
legislative grant of authority. No court has yet considered the issue of whether
mini-tender offers constitute tender offers. 166 Instead, the courts have allowed the
161.
Id. "We are aware that some broker-dealers may forward certain mini-tender
offers to their customers because they have concluded that they have a fiduciary duty to do
so. We do not express a view on, or address in this letter, the extent of any such fiduciary
duties." Id. at n.5.
162.
Id. at 1-2.
163.
Berick supra note 3, at 3.
164.
Id.
165.
See Hirschhorn, supra note 28, at 630.
166.
A mini-tender offer is not a transaction that traditionally falls within the
definition of tender offer; however, this is not fatal to applying the
Williams Act. The S-G Securities court developed its test because it had
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handful of enforcement actions against mini-tender offerors to go forward, thereby
tacitly supporting the SEC's position
that mini-tender offers are in fact tender
67
offers for purposes of § 14(e).1
Second, even if the SEC is found to have the statutory authority to bring
enforcement actions against mini-tender offerors for violations of § 14(e), its use
of the suggested disclosures in the Release to determine fraudulent, manipulative,
and deceptive practices is inappropriate. The Release is not binding as a matter of
law. Further,
it is unclear what degree of deference courts will afford the
68
Release. 1
To guarantee the investor protections it seeks, the SEC must resolve these
two issues by definitively bringing mini-tender offers within the scope of §
14(d)(2)-(8) and (e). The SEC must then utilize its statutory grant of authority to
promulgate binding regulations under § 14(e) that spell out the conduct required of
mini-tender offerors, and the consequences of non-compliance. To the extent
necessary and appropriate, the SEC should also promulgate mandatory disclosure
provisions to be used by broker-dealers when disseminating mini-tender offers to
their clients.
With respect to the first issue, there are several approaches to bringing
mini-tender offers conclusively within the scope of §§ 14(d)(2)-(8) and (e). First,
the SEC could use its legislative grant of authority to promulgate rules applicable
to both §§ 14(d) and (e) and to Regulation 14E, setting out a definition of "tender
offer" that specifically includes mini-tender offers. The definition could include
conventional tender offers, mini-tender offers, and any transaction with the
potential to coerce security holders into making hurried, uninformed decisions,
regardless of whether the offer was made with the intent to acquire control. 69 Such
a definition would move beyond the Congressional intent in enacting the Williams
Act, and the concurrent focus on offers to purchase securities made with the
intention to acquire control.170 Although the SEC and courts have resisted this idea
since the Williams Act was enacted, the lack of clarity in this area now has begun
to outweigh the flexibility gained by leaving the term undefined.
Another approach would be for Congress to amend the 1934 Act to
include a definition of tender offer within the list of definitions (currently fiftynine) included therein.' 7' While the legislative history of the Williams Act reflects

come across a transaction that was not within the bounds of a traditional
tender offer, but was one that the Williams Act had intended to govern.
In due course, a court could, and should, logically expand the definition
of a tender offer to include mini-tender offers in order to further
implement the remedial nature of the Williams Act.
Id. at 647.
167.
See Part IIIA-2 infra for a discussion of these enforcement actions.
168.
See Hirschhorn, supra note 28, at 656-57.
169.
See The Developing Meaning of "Tender Offer, " supra note 19, at 1275.
170.
See id at 1270. "The Commission shall, for purposes of this subsection, by
rules and regulations, define, and prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent, such acts
and practices as are fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative." 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (2003).
171.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(l)-(59) (2003).
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a strong Congressional reluctance to create a statutory definition for the term
"tender offer," the passage of forty years and the numerous judicial opinions
wrestling with the parameters of the definition may be sufficient to overcome this
reluctance. A less expansive approach would be for Congress to lower or remove
the 5% threshold in § 14(d)(l), providing those who tender in mini-tender offers
the protections thereunder to offerees in conventional tender offers. If security
holders are given the protections of § 14(d)(1), they would also be entitled to the
protections of Regulation 14D, with its additional withdrawal and proration rights,
and increased price protection.172 Congress could also accomplish the same result
by changing the term "tender offer" to "offer" in § 14(d)(1). While this approach
would provide additional protection for those who tender in mini-tender offers, it
is problematic. First, Congress had an opportunity to remove the threshold entirely
in 1970 when it lowered the ownership requirement from 10% to 5%, but elected
not to do so.173 This may be indicative of a Congressional unwillingness to make
either of these changes. Also, if any offer to buy stock were covered by the
Williams Act, including § 14(d)(1), the cost of the typical stock purchase would
dramatically increase due to the disclosure obligations. Further, numerous
provisions, including the withdrawal, proration, and increased price protections in
Regulation 14D, would be logistically difficult to implement in individual stock
sales, and might need to be excluded. In addition to undermining the original
Congressional intent in enacting § 14(d), the practical result of either action would
as full disclosure
be to render the disclosure requirements of § 13(d) meaningless,
74
would already be required under this new § 14(d)(1).1
Once the first issue has been resolved, and mini-tender offers have been
conclusively determined by judicial opinion, statute, or regulation to be tender
offers for purposes of §§ 14(d)(2)-(8) and (e), the SEC must take steps to curb the
conduct that it finds troublesome. The SEC should enact binding regulations
setting forth the matrix of disclosure necessary to keep mini-tender offers from
violating § 14(e). Although Regulation 14D is inapplicable to mini-tender offers
by its terms, its regulatory approach is a good model for the new mini-tender offer
regulations suggested below. Rule 14d-6 details the disclosures required in a
tender offer, cross-referencing relevant sections of Form TO and Regulation M-

Under Rule 14d-7, those who tender are entitled to withdraw any tendered
172.
securities as long as the offer remains open. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-7. Rule 14d-8 removes
the 10 day period set out in § 14(d)(6), and requires pro rata purchases on oversubscribed
offers regardless of when the offer's maximum shares was reached. See 17 C.F.R. §
240.14d-8 (2003). Rule 14d-10 requires the highest consideration paid to anyone who
tenders be paid to everyone who tenders. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-10.
Securities Act Amendments of 1970, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d).
173.
See The Developing Meaning of "Tender Offer," supra note 19, at 1275.
174.
Section 13(d) requires those who acquire beneficial ownership of more than 5% of a class of
securities must disclose, among other things: the background, identity, residence and
citizenship of such beneficial owner; the source and amount of funds used in the purchase;
the purpose of the purchase; the number of shares owned and the number of shares such
beneficial owner has the right to acquire; information as to contracts, arrangements or
understandings about the class of securities. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d).
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A. 175 The new "Schedule 14D" regulations should detail the disclosures required in
a mini-tender offer, as well as the consequences of non-compliance. All required
disclosures should be made in plain English, with typeface no smaller than the
typeface for the balance of the offering materials. 76 The new regulation should
include, at a minimum, the following:
Summary Term Sheet: The bidder should be required to provide security
holders with a summary term sheet, just as tender offerors must do under Item
1001 of Regulation M-A. 17 Item 1001 requires a brief description of the most
material terms of the proposed transaction, and must provide security holders with
"sufficient information to understand the essential features and significance of the
proposed transaction."' 178 This language is helpful as a starting point, but is
insufficient as written to accomplish the SEC's goal of investor protection in minitender offers. Reasonable minds could arguably differ on what constitutes
"sufficient information to understand the essential features and significance" of a
mini-tender offer. Would simply disclosing the lack of a price premium, or the
absence of withdrawal and proration rights be sufficient? The SEC should make
clear in the regulation the minimum information necessary to satisfy the
sufficiency requirement. A better approach would be to list the disclosures
required to satisfy the regulation, including the recommended disclosures that
follow.
Target Company Information: The bidder should be required to provide
information about the target company, just as tender offerors must do under Item
1002 of Regulation M-A.' 7 9 The bidder must provide the name and address of the
target company, and the exact title and number of shares outstanding of the subject
class of securities as of the most recent practicable date. Further, the bidder must
identify the principal market, if any, on which the subject securities are traded,
along with the high and low sales price for each quarter of the past two years. If
there is no established trading market for this class of securities, the bidder must
disclose this. Arguably, the security holder ought to know this already about the
securities she owns. However, this abundance of caution will foreclose the
possibility of a security holder unknowingly tendering in a below-market minitender offer (assuming of course that the security holder actually reads the offering

175.
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-6 (2003). See also 17 C.F.R § 240.14d-100; 17
C.F.R. § 229.1000-1016 (2003).
See 17 C.F.R. §230.421(b),(d) (2003) for a description of plain English
176.
disclosure.
177.
The summary term sheet must briefly describe in bullet point format the
most material terms of the proposed transaction. The summary term
sheet must provide security holders with sufficient information to
understand the essential features and significance of the proposed
transaction. The bullet points must cross-reference a more detailed
discussion contained in the disclosure document that is disseminated to
security holders.

17 C.F.R. § 229.1001.
Id.
178.
See 17 C.F.R. § 229.1002.
179.
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materials). 80 The SIA proposed to the SEC that any regulation of mini-tender
offers require the bidder to disclose any marketplace events that may have caused
an unusual fluctuation in the market price of the securities.'81 This seems a matter
of discretion, and in the absence of a definition of what constitutes an unusual
fluctuation in the market price of the securities, this addition is not likely to add to
the quality of disclosure provided to mini-tender offerees.
Identity and Background of the Bidder: The bidder should be required to

provide information about itself, just as tender offerors must do under Item 1003 of
Regulation M-A. 8 2 The bidder must disclose its name, business address, and
business telephone number, including control persons and promoters, and any
affiliation between target and bidder. 8 3 Again, this will enable security holders to
make more informed decisions about whether to tender.
Terms of the Transaction: The bidder should be required to provide
information about the terms of the transaction, just as tender offerors must do
under Item 1004 of Regulation M-A. 84 The bidder should disclose the material
terms of the transaction, including the total number and class of securities sought
and the type and amount of consideration offered.' 8 5 With respect to the offer
price, bidders must prominently disclose if the offer price is below market, and list
the current market price. The bidder must also disclose any intent to repeatedly
extend the offer until the market price exceeds the offer price. The bidder must
disclose any future tender offer plans for the target. With respect to price changes,
bidders must disclose any reduction in the offering price due to distributions made
to security holders, and fees imposed by the bidder, with the amount if known. If
the bidder changes the price, the offer must be extended for 10 business days under
Rule 14e-l(b).
The bidder must disclose the scheduled expiration date as well as any
ability and intent to extend the offer. 8 6 The bidder must disclose the procedures
for tendering and withdrawing, if available. If there are no withdrawal rights in the
mini-tender offer, the bidder must disclose this, and explain that the lack of
withdrawal rights continues even if the bidder extends the offer. If withdrawal

The remaining requirements of Item 2002 (dividends, prior public offerings,
180.
and prior stock purchases) are beyond the scope of the investor protections sought by the
SEC in mini-tender offers. In fact, the omitted items are not required when filing Schedule
TO in a tender offer. See 17 C.F.R § 240.14d-100.
See SIA Letter, supra note 154.
181.
See 17 C.F.R. § 229.1003 (2003).
182.
See 17 C.F.R § 240.14d-100, Item 3 (requiring the information set out in
183.
Item 1003(a)-(c) of Regulation M-A, 17 C.F.R. § 229.1003). See also Mini-Tender Offer
Release, supra note 2, at 2249.
See 17 C.F.R. §229.1004 (2003).
184.
See 17 C.F.R § 240.14d-100, Item 4 (requiring the information set out in
185.
Item 1004(a) of Regulation M-A, 17 C.F.R. § 229.1004). See also Mini-Tender Offer
Release, supra note 2, at 2249.
See 17 C.F.R § 240.14d-100, Item 4, (requiring the information set out in
186.
Item 1004(a) of Regulation M-A, 17 C.F.R. § 229.1004). See also Mini-Tender Offer
Release, supra note 2, at 2249.
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rights do exist, the bidder must fully explain the procedure and the manner in
which securities will be accepted for payment.
The bidder must disclose whether securities will be accepted pro rata if
the offer is over-subscribed.' 87 If there is no pro rata provision, the bidder must
disclose that shares will be purchased on a first-come, first-served basis and as a
result, the offer may not remain as long as it was supposed to.
Source of Funds: Bidders should be required to provide information about
the source of its funds, just as tender offerors must do under Item 1007 of
Regulation M-A. 188 A mini-tender offer without adequate financing in place
violates Rule 14e-8(c), which prohibits a person from publicly announcing a tender
offer if that person "does not have the reasonable belief that the person will have
the means to purchase the securities to complete the offer."' 189 Thus, the bidder
must disclose whether it has adequate financing to complete the offer at the start of
the offer, including the source of funds, and any material conditions to the
financing. 190
Target Management's Response: The bidder should be required to
provide information about the target management's response, just as tender
offerors must do under Item 1012(a) of Regulation M-A.1 9' The bidder must
disclose whether the target is aware of the offer, and that if the target is aware of
the offer, the target must make a recommendation to its shareholders within ten
days of the start of the offer. In such case, the bidder must disclose that additional
information will be coming from the target's management. The bidder must
disclose all material conditions to the offer, all of which must be based on
objective criteria or the offer may be illusory and violate § 14(e).

V. CONCLUSION
The SEC seems determined to stem the flow of potential abuses in minitender offers. But the agency lacks the authority under the present statutory
scheme to bring about the mandatory disclosures it seeks. The SEC recognizes that
mini-tender offers are beyond the scope of § 14(d)(1) as a result of the subsection's
5% trigger, and thus claims mini-tender offers are subject only to § 14(e) and
Regulation 14E.192 Ironically, the statutory reality threatens the SEC's authority to
bring enforcement actions under § 14(e).
The combination of conclusively bringing mini-tender offers within the
scope of § 14(d)(2)-(8), and the articulation of specific, legally-required

187.
See 17 C.F.R § 240.14d-100, Item 4, requiring the information set out in Item
1004(a) of Regulation M-A, 17 C.F.R. § 229.1004. See also Mini-Tender Offer Release,
supra note 2, at 2249.
188.
See 17 C.F.R. § 229.1007 (2003).
189.
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-8(c) (2003).
190.
See 17 C.F.R § 240.14d-100, Item 7, (requiring the information set out in
Item 1007(a),(b),(d) of Regulation M-A, 17 C.F.R. § 229.1007(a)). See also Mini-Tender
Offer Release, supra note 2, at 2250.
191.
See 17 C.F.R. § 229.1012(a) (2003).
192.
See Mini-Tender Offer Release, supra note 2, at 2247.
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disclosures will better enable the SEC to achieve the investor protection it seeks
for mini-tender offers. In an abundance of caution, the SEC could also enact
binding regulations requiring broker-dealers who disseminate mini-tender offers to
craft a risk factor disclosure. 193 This option would become less necessary if the
new regulations discussed herein were promulgated by the SEC.
Once mini-tender offers are brought within the scope of the Williams Act,
mini-tender offerees would be entitled to the protection of § 14(d)(5)-(8). More
importantly, the SEC's right to bring enforcement actions against mini-tender
offers for violations of § 14(e) would be conclusive. This result, coupled with the
promulgation of binding regulations setting out the required disclosures for minitender offers, and the consequences of failure to comply therewith, will permit the
SEC to at last achieve the investor protections it has long sought in mini-tender
offers.

193.
The disclosure could include a definition of mini-tender offers and the
resulting inapplicability of certain disclosure and procedural rules that apply to traditional
tender offers. See SIA Letter, supra note 154, at 4. The broker-dealer should advise its
customers to check the current market price for the security, and that mini-tender offers for
above-market prices may be extended beyond their initial expiration date, during which
time the market price may rise above the offer price. Id. The broker-dealer must disclose
that certain deductions are made to the offer price for dividends, distributions and other
fees. Id. at 5. The disclosure must indicate that there may be no proration or withdrawal
rights, with complete explanations of both concepts and the potential effects on the security
holder. Id. Further, the disclosure must indicate that just because the bidder is making the
mini-tender offer is no guarantee the bidder has or will obtain adequate financing to pay for
tendered shares. Id. Additionally, security holders may be exchanging publicly-traded
securities for non-publicly traded stock, which may limit the resale possibilities after the
consummation of the mini-tender offer. Id. As a catch-all, the broker-dealers should inform
security holders that the target company is required to make a recommendation on the minitender offer, once it has notice of the offer, and that security holders should consult their
financial advisers, as the forwarding of the mini-tender offer materials and this disclosure
do not constitute any recommendation by the broker-dealer on the merits of the offer. Id.
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